The last decades have seen a vivid discussion about the nature of the self. Much of this discussion centers around how we should conceive of the self. But the self debate goes beyond purely philosophical implications. It is also central to cognitive (neuro) science, psychology and psychiatry. In this context, the most prominent approaches to the self include the substance view, the phenomenological view and the no-self view. They all represent different interpretations of what the nature of the self is. But eventhough the metaphysics of the self is widely discussed, it seems that one important determinant is largely neglected, namely the revelation thesis. The most general form of the revelation thesis states that by having an experience, we are in a position toknow the essence or nature of experience. In this paper, we will explore the, what we think, implicit adoption of revelation by many metaphysicians within the self debate. In a first step, we will analyze the relation between claims about the nature of the self and how those claims come about. From there we will argue that the metaphysics of the self is deeply affected by the revelation thesis.