If a non-spatiotemporal structure underlies space- time and the latter emerges from the former, then spacetime is not a fun- damental entity. Leaning on this, it has been defended that fundamental physical objects cannot be spatiotemporal (see, e.g., Wüthrich (2019)). How should the building relationship between fundamental physical ontology and spacetime then be understood? According to whether or not composition is adequate to grasp this relationship, some have proposed understanding it in mereological terms (see, e.g., Bihan (2018)), whereas others have advocated alternatives which overcome mereology (see, e.g., Baron (2021)). The work- shop aims to further explore the current metaphysical discussions concerning this relationship by considering different perspectives on the emergence of spacetime and how it relates to fundamental physical ontology, and in par- ticular whether that relationship is to be understood in mereological terms.
Everyone is invited to submit an abstract no longer than 300 words and addressing topics discussed at the conference. Co-authored abstracts are admitted for submission too. The proposal must be sent with a short academic biographical note (50-150 words) that lists any degrees and the institutions where they were obtained, as well as your current affiliation.
All submissions should be sent to our mail email@example.com by March 31, 2023, in order to be considered. We anticipate being able to offer 2–3 slots to submitted presentations and priority will be given to early-career researchers (current graduate students and those within 5 years post-PhD). Women philosophers and philosophers from other under-represented groups are warmly encouraged to apply. The presentations will last no more than 45 minutes. Decisions will be communicated by April 15, 2023.
Sam Baron (Australian Catholic University) – online
Baptiste Le Bihan (University of Geneva)
Christian Wüthrich (University of Geneva)