Hartry Field (1989) famously challenges platonists to explain the reliable match between mathematical truth and belief. The challenge grounds an objection claiming that platonists cannot provide such an explanation. This objection is often taken to be both neutral with respect to controversial epistemological assumptions, and a comparatively forceful objection against platonists. I argue that these two characteristics are in tension; no construal of the objection in the current literature realises both, and there are reasons to think that no such version of Field’s epistemological objection can be constructed.

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O seminário será realizado em videoconferência, via Zoom.
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Seminário organizado no âmbito do projecto EITNS, em parceria com o LangCog Research Group (CFUL)